20180729 ARD Mittagsmagazin mit Schwerpunkt Videoüberwachung

29.07.2018 ARD Mittagsmagazin mit Schwerpunkt Videoüberwachung

One year surveillance railway station Berlin Südkreuz

The project of Deutsche Bahn, the Federal Criminal Police Office and the Federal Police at Südkreuz station will end in two days. For one year volunteers were used to test recognition and tracking by facial recognition software. This is a level 3 video surveillance system after the normal observation and storage, which can also calculate and save a movement profile of the people through the tracking.

Aktion Freiheit statt Angst has pointed to the launch of the project and also last November with local actions on the dangers to our privacy and our fundamental rights. In the spring, we sent the project promoters a comprehensive catalog of questions and demands but after 4 months received only an inadequate answer.

On the occasion of the end of the project, the Noon Magazine of ARD will deal with the subject of video surveillance on Tuesday at 13h. Together with representatives of "Digitale Freiheit" and "Endstation", we have represented our point of view on this topic. Here is a collection of our arguments:

Arguments against video surveillance

The content and objectives of the project at Südkreuz station are still as unclear as they were a year ago

The project is funded by public funds. This requires transparency, but even the data protection concept remains secret.
We had to inform ourselves, we counted the cameras and cataloged 120 cameras on a railway station.
Not even a mouse remains undetected at Südkreuz station!
We have developed a catalog of questions and demands on the monitoring project.
We only got very few and completely inadequate answers to the questionnaire!

One goal of the project is facial recognition using biometric photos

There is a risk that, in accordance with the "Electronic Identity Promotion Act" from April 2017 all of our biometric photos, that we had to submit to create our identity cards / passports, would be accessable by the software.
In 2003, when introducing the biometric photos for personal documents, we were promised that there would be no central storage of this data and no use other than the production of the ID cards.
The misuse and theft of biometric data in a central database is only a matter of time.
The threat of cybercrime is highly topical.
Who should actually access the data in case of a possible active operation?
Should that also be employees of private DB security? A blending of government tasks and support services by private companies is unacceptable!

Video surveillance is useless

A number of older studies on the impact of video surveillance auf die Kriminalitätsrate bestätigen, dass Vidoüberwachung nichts nützt.
on the crime rate confirm that video surveillance is of no use.
The latest study on the effects of video surveillance from Prof Pfeiffer of the Criminological Research Institute of Niedersachsen includes the crime rates in 7 cities in Nordrhein-Westfalen.
The result of this study is: the crime rate does not change with the extension of CCTV.
In London, this has already been recognized, cameras are being rebuilt, because the many recordings can no longer be watched over.
A camera is watching and saving and but mainly watching!
But it does not prevent anything, it does not come to the rescue, also because no one is sitting behind it on the screen anymore.
The short-sighted goal of the authorities is job cuts and alleged savings!

Cost use Bill

Video surveillance is expensive.
It always creates a great deal of technical effort through the purchase, installation, maintenance and operation of the equipment, such as backup etc.
For software-based systems (which are now all of them) constantly updates are to be incorporated and to test the function.
Better for the real security of the people would be trained local staff.
WE demand more human and well-trained staff!

Consequences of video surveillance

The consequence of observation is a behavioral change of humans.
Constant observation unsettles and leads to behavioral change leading to adaptation in the first stage.
A further increase in surveillance can lead to aggressive behavior and eventually to rebellion.
It's a difference if people look at people or if cameras are focused on people.
The speaker of Digitale Freiheitalso rejected the argument "I have nothing to hide". Everyone has a privacy that is protected solely on the basis of human dignity (Article 1 of the "Grundgesetz").

Wrong identification - False positive

Every algorithm makes mistakes.
False Identified (false positives) then have to prove their innocence.
This is a reversal of the constitutionally protected presumption of innocence.
The former Minister of the Interior De Maiziere called in the fall of 2017, a recognition rate of 70% at the Südkreuz pilot a success.
In a real scenario, this would lead to hundreds of wrongly recognized people every day at Südkreuz station.
In the UK, hooligans should be identified by "intelligent" face recognition at football matches in autumn 2017.
The tests were subject to error rates of 92 and 98%.
An attempt in Mainz main station was stopped 10 years ago because of recognition rates below 50%.
Even simple "counter measures" such as sunglasses, a glued beard, a hood or a scarf reduce the detection rate to zero.
In contrast to the huge financial outlay for the system, even small expenses at low cost can lead to 100% "being unrecognized".
The argument "more security" becomes a meaningless promise!

What remains?

Cameras are passive.
Cameras inhibit the moral courage of people watching a crime, assuming that "that is seen and help will come".
Cameras do not prevent crimes!
So should we accept restrictions on fundamental rights only because of a supposedly better enlightenment? We say NO!

Fundamental rights interference by video surveillance

We know 3 levels of video surveillance: observation, recording and tracking.
The fundamental rights intervention gets stronger with each level.
Whether a fundamental rights intervention must be tolerated is examined on the basis of proportionality.
Tracking across multiple cameras allows motion profiles to be created.
Once you accept a level, you will be forced to legalize all possible future surveillance technologies.
The German Bar Association notes: "The presence of a variety of video surveillance systems leads to a diffuse feeling of permanent monitoring. This already represents an interference with fundamental rights issues."
Exactly such a formulation comes from various judgments of the Federal Constitutional Court for Data Retention (VDS), the eavesdropping and the online search. It would be expected that the BVerfG also sees this for the video surveillance, because the surveillance total account (Überwachungsgesamtrechnung) had already reached in the judgment of the VDS the permissible upper limit.
Even the proportionality of a fundamental rights intervention only to the supposedly "easier" enlightenment is questionable.
Face recognition cancels people's anonymity in public.
At the latest at this point, the right informational self-determination is violated for every person observed, Art. 2 GG.
The right to privacy, in this case the right to one's own image is violated in any case. (But no fundamental right)
The freedom of assembly, Art. 8 GG, is also violated by a possible identification of the participants.
The people are taken the opportunity to move unobserved, right to freedom of movement, Art. 11 GG